Author: James Wemyss
Graduation Year: 2005
Advisor: J.P. Singh
Reader: Mark Habeeb
Date: 08 June 2006
Link to Thesis: JamesWemys.pdf
The principle question this thesis asks is how can weaker negotiators use specific tactics to not only reach agreement during an impasse or stalemate in multi-lateral environmental negotiations, but also gain concessions. I argue that during multi-lateral environmental negotiations, weaker negotiators that use specific tactics of agenda setting and coalition building effectively can shift the zone of agreement with stronger actors, thus allowing for an agreed outcome that would have otherwise not occurred, provided that there is ample bargaining space. In essence, this thesis argues two points: negotiations matter for weaker countries and the variability of effectiveness for specific tactics can help explain a shift in the zone of agreement in multi-lateral environmental negotiations.
This thesis will examine the Biosafety Protocol from the years of 1996-2000. Following the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, there was pressure to draft a protocol on the impact of biotechnology on biodiversity. The negotiation, which included those that ratified the Convention on Biodiversity (138 countries total) and the United States (who is currently not a member), produced three major coalitions: the Miami Group, the Like-Minded Group, and the European Union. The Miami Group, formed by the United States, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Australia, and Canada, was a major grower of transgenic crops and was negotiating for more open trade of genetically modified food. The Like-Minded Group (LMG), which consisted of all developing countries except those that joined the Miami Group, called for a comprehensive scope to the protocol that would include socio-economic and human health considerations. I will argue that weaker countries, consisting of the Like-Minded Group (LMG), used specific tactics of coalition building and agenda setting more effectively in the 2000 negotiations than they did in 1999. The effective use of tactics during the 2000 negotiations shifted the zone of agreement between the Like-Minded Group and the Miami Group on the issue of the precautionary approach. This shows that weaker countries not only were able to reach an agreement with a stronger coalition, but that they were able to get a concession from the use of effective tactics.